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Abstract 
A watchdog processor for the MOTOROLA 
M68040© microprocessor is presented. Its main task 
is to protect from transient faults caused by SEU’s 
the transmission of data between the processor and 
the system memory, and to ensure a correct 
instructions’ flow, just monitoring the external bus, 
without modifying the internal architecture of the 
M68040©. A description of the principal procedures 
is given, together with the method used for 
monitoring the instructions’ flow. 
 
1. Introduction 
Electronic systems for military, avionic and 
aerospace applications require high reliability and 
availability [1] [2]. Fault-tolerance and Fault-
Avoidance have always been an essential attribute to 
keep them working in harsh environments.  
Radiations and electromagnetic interferences (EMI) 
are typical causes of faults. EMI can enter a system in 
two ways, through the system wiring harness or 
directly into the electronic modules. The interference 
gives rise to Radio Frequency (RF) currents and 
voltages causing the system or module to 
malfunction. EMI can be generated by two sources: 
external EMI sources (from commercial broadcast 
equipment or mobile telephones to Citizen's Band 
radio) and internal modules that can generate high 
frequency interferences transmitted through the 
system wiring harness or radiated to other modules. 
The amplitude of these fields range from a few volts 
per meter to a reported 200 V/m measured on public 
roads in the UK [3]. The effects of these noises do 
not damage any component, but temporary change 
the state of the system. This type of faulty behavior is 
called Transient Fault [4]. Because of their random 
and non-recurring nature, transient faults are difficult 
to detect and isolate, hence they become a source of 
major concern, especially in critical real-time 
applications.  
The use of high integration technologies in safety 
critical systems imposes the designer to introduce on-
line error detection mechanisms to prevent the 
catastrophic effects of radiations and electromagnetic 
interferences.  
Many solutions for on-line error detection and 
correction have been proposed in literature.  Mainly 
they are classified into circuit level solutions based 
on codes for memories, parity bits for data buses, 
residue codes for ALU’s [5] and system level 
techniques based on fault-tolerant data structures and 
replication [6] [7]. All of these approaches are 
effective in protect systems against transient errors 
but usually introduce high overhead and require 
major changes in the system layout making difficult 
their use in commercial or already designed circuits.  
An alternative solution is the use of so called 
watchdog processors. A watchdog processor [8] [9] 
is a small and simple coprocessor used to perform 
concurrent system-level error detection by 
monitoring the behavior of a main processor. Error 
detection and correction by means of a watchdog is a 
two phases process. In the first phase (setup phase) 
the watchdog is provided with information about the 
processor or process to be checked. During the 
second phase (checking) it monitors the processor 
and collects the relevant information concurrently. 
Error detection is done by comparing the information 
collected at run-time with the information provided 
during the setup phase. The watchdog can be added 
to any system without major changes. 
This work focuses on transient errors in systems 
based on the Motorola M68040© microprocessor. 
This processor is used in many critical systems like 
Automatic Traffic Control (ATC) of railways 
systems. Instead of using high costs military 
components or Triple Module Redundancy 
techniques, a dedicated watchdog processor is used to 
perform on-line system-level error detection. It 
interacts with the processor through the system bus, 
only. In order to detect and correct errors, the 
watchdog monitors the bus transfers and forces the 
processor to repeat unsuccessful transmissions. This 
technique allows high reliability also in case of long 
perturbations. 
The paper is organized as follow: Section 2 
describes the target fault model. Section 3 details the 
mechanisms used into the watchdog to tolerate 
different types of faults, whereas Section 4 gives an 
overview of the watchdog implementation. At last, 
Section 5 concludes the paper and presents the on-
going activities. 
2. The Fault Model 
In our work we deal with two main transient faults 
sources: radiations and electromagnetic interferences. 
The main effects of these sources are Single Event 
Upset (SEU) and voltage or current glitches. The 
SEU is one of the major sources of bit-flips in digital 
electronics. A bit-flip is an undesired change in the 
state of a memory cell. A SEU can cause the state of 
a memory cell to change from 0 to 1 or 1 to 0.  
Voltage and current glitches are noise induced on the 
circuit’s interconnections that can lead to a 
misinterpretation of a logic level. In a microprocessor 
based systems these errors can be located in three 
main areas: 
x Memory Fault: is one of the most common 
effects of noise in microprocessor systems. It 
usually consists of a SEU appearing in a memory 
location. Both program and data are stored in 
memory and can be affected by these errors.  
x Processor Fault: it is similar to the memory 
fault. The internal state of the processor is altered 
causing an erroneous execution of the program, 
with secondary effects like memory data 
corruption and incorrect operation of peripheral 
circuitries. It is caused by a SEU in an internal 
register of the processor. 
x Bus Fault: these errors can be caused by voltage 
or current glitches on the microprocessor I/O 
pins or on the system buses. They result in 
incorrect data transfer and, therefore, data 
corruption during processing (see Figure 1). 
Despite the different locations and causes of faults, 
the error effects can be classified in two categories: 
x Data Errors: they appear when the content of a 
variable stored in memory or inside a 
microprocessor register is altered.  
x Control Flow Errors: they appear when the 
content of a memory cell or a microprocessor 
register storing an instruction is altered, and the 
effect is the execution of an incorrect sequence 
of instructions. 
The Watchdog processor has been therefore 
designed with the goal of tolerating faults responsible 
of these two classes of errors. 
 
Figure 1: An Incorrect Data Transfer 
3. The Watchdog Processor 
The main goal of the watchdog is to check the 
correctness of the data exchanged between the 
microprocessor and the external memory and to 
implement a control flow checking mechanism in 
order to guarantee the correct execution of a program. 
The watchdog is fully transparent to the processor, 
it is connected to the system bus, and monitors every 
transfer directed towards and from the M68040©. 
When it detects faults, it raises an interrupt in order to 
stop the execution of the program and to inform the 
processor that something is wrong. 
The two main strategies that have been 
implemented to address data and control flow errors 
will be analyzed in the following sections. Section 
3.3 describes the strategy used to detect bus faults. 
3.1. Data protection 
Data stored in memory can be affected by transient 
faults during the execution of a program. To detect 
and correct data values, the watchdog has an internal 
memory where it stores a copy of the variables used 
by the program. In particular: 
x Each write operation of a variable performed by 
the processor to the memory is intercepted on the 
bus by the watchdog, which reads the value of 
the variable and creates a copy of it (shadow 
variable) inside its internal memory.  
x Each read operation performed by the processor 
is intercepted by the watchdog that checks 
between the value on the bus and the shadow 
value stored in its internal memory.  
In this way every fault appearing in a variable 
stored in the system memory is detected. Obviously it 
is not possible to duplicate all the application 
variables inside the watchdog; only a subset of them 
can be duplicated through the watchdog mechanism. 
This subset is composed by the most critical variables 
(MCV) of the program. A variable is defined critical 
if, when affected by a fault, it can cause the program 
to terminate correctly but producing wrong results. 
The methodology to select the best subset of critical 
variables is explained in [10]. The addresses of the 
MCVs can be programmed in the watchdog before 
starting the execution of the target application. 
The size of the memory used to store the MCVs 
allows trading-off between area overhead and 
reliability. 
3.2. Control flow checking 
A bit flip in the application binary code stored in 
memory or occurring during an instruction fetch may 
cause a wrong execution of the program. Control-
flow checking has become a widely studied approach 
to concurrently detect these classes of errors. The test 
aims at detecting erroneous sequences of instructions 
in a program execution [11] [12].  
The main idea is to split the application program 
into elementary blocks with single entry. A generic 
program is represented by a so-called Flow Control 
Graph (FCG) (Figure 2) in which each Branch Free 
Block represents a sequence of consecutive 
instructions without branches whereas each Control 
Node represents a branch instruction.  
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Figure 2: Control Flow Graph 
To check the control flow of a program the 
watchdog has solve two problems: 
x Verify that the instructions inside a branch free 
block are correctly executed; 
x Check the branch free blocks are executed in a 
correct order.  
The first problem is addressed by calculating a 
signature for each branch free block. It is computed 
signing the opcode of the instructions of the branch 
free block. A golden signature is calculated off line 
and stored in the watchdog internal memory. At run 
time the watchdog computes again the signature of 
each block and compares it with the golden one. 
The second problem has been addressed in [13]. 
The authors proposed a signature scheme based on 
the regular expression formalism. The set of the 
allowed sequences of branch free blocks is 
represented using a complex regular expression. Each 
branch free block is coded using a label. The 
sequences of labels obtained by the execution of the 
branch free blocks are valid if they are recognized by 
the regular expression. The watchdog, by inspecting 
the sequence of instruction addresses on the address 
bus, is able to build the sequence of executed branch 
free block (i.e. the sequence of labels representing the 
blocks) and to check its correctness. It stores in its 
internal memory a table mapping each label with the 
address of the first instruction of the related branch 
free block. 
If one of the two signature mechanisms detects an 
error, the watchdog sends to the M68040© a bus 
error acknowledgment and updates its status register 
on an idle state, waiting for a reset.  
3.3. Bus protection 
Data Protection and Control Flow Checking are 
able to detect faults occurring on the system bus but 
they require modifying the target application. This is 
sometime not possible. To allow flexibility, the 
watchdog is able to implement a general bus 
protection strategy based on Automatic Repeat 
Request (ARR). Transient error occurring on the bus, 
are supposed to be extinguished until a limited 
number of bus cycles. When the ARR is activated, 
the watchdog starts to monitor the bus transfers 
between the M68040© and the system memory and 
ask the processor to repeat each transmission multiple 
times. The Watchdog stops to request new transfers 
when at least two consecutive transmissions return 
the same data. The watchdog receives all the 
information necessary to implements the ARR from 
the external bus and from the M68040© and not need 
any modification of the application.  
The ARR introduces a very high time overhead. 
Nevertheless it can be activate only when the target 
application cannot be modified or the level of 
reliability need to be very high. Furthermore the 
flexibility of the watchdog allows activating the ARR 
only for very critical portion of the program allowing 
to lower the final time overhead. 
4. Watchdog implementation 
The watchdog has been described in VHDL. It 
receives all the information necessary to operate from 
the external bus and from the M68040©. The 
M68040©’s pins directly connected to the watchdog 
are TS (Transfer Start), TA (Transfer Acknowledge), 
and TEA (Transfer Error Acknowledge).  
Every executable program that wants to make use 
of the watchdog has to transfer to its internal memory 
all the addresses of the chosen set of MCVs, the 
signatures and the structure of the program control 
flow. After that, the watchdog is initialized and the 
execution of the target application can begin to be 
monitored.  
The watchdog is able to monitor the following 
operations: 
x Read and Write of generic data (no MCV or 
signature): the watchdog realizes that the data the 
M68040© is reading or writing is not a MCV or 
a signature and so it works in order to ensure the 
correctness of the data transfer, without 
involving the data stored in its internal memory; 
x Read and Write of MCV: when the watchdog 
realizes the data to be read is a MCV, after 
activating the bus-switch, it forces on the 
external bus the datum stored into its shadow 
memory. Whenever a MCV is to be written, the 
watchdog updates the MCV of the internal 
shadow memory. In both the two cases, if the 
watchdog detects an error at the very moment the 
M68040© reads or writes a datum, it sends to the 
processor an error signal, recognized as a bus 
error; 
x Check of signature (control of instruction flow): 
In the last case, if the data (correctly read) is a 
signature, it is subjected to a second check. The 
signature just read must be one of the possible 
ones, taking into account the whole structure of 
the program previously stored into the shadow 
memory. Only if the read signature is not one of 
the possible ones that can be received, the 
watchdog sends an error acknowledgment to the 
M68040© and stops working, otherwise it 
continues regularly. 
To evaluate the fault tolerance of the system, a 
testing program has been written. The testing 
program is endowed with a setup phase in which the 
MCVs are set and the signatures are properly chosen. 
The execution length of the testing program is of 
30,22us, but this value is increased by the presence of 
the watchdog up to 50,22us due to the RETRY 
cycles. Faults are injected on the bus and the system 
memory by means of simulation. 
All the simulations differ each other for the 
duration of the single fault (fault’s length), ranging 
from 10ns to 200ns. 
The fault injector is able to understand different 
execution of the testing program. A Wrong Execution 
is caused by undetected errors that can either modify 
the expected results or stop the execution of the 
program. Detection means that an error that has just 
occurred cannot be corrected by the watchdog. 
Correct Execution includes both those executions not 
affected by the injection of faults and also those 
executions in which errors have been corrected. 
Figure 3 shows the whole trend of the testing 
program’s results w.r.t. the injection’s length. 
 
Figure 3: Fault injection results 
5. Conclusions 
This paper presented a watchdog processor for the 
M68040© microprocessor. The main goal of the 
proposed architecture is to detect errors caused by 
radiations and electromagnetic interferences. The 
watchdog interacts with the processor through the 
system bus, in order to check the integrity of the most 
critical variables and the correct control flow of the 
executed application. We are currently finalizing the 
design in order to have an optimal synthesizable 
description of the circuit. The following step will be 
the implementation of fault injection experiments to 
demonstrate the capabilities of the implemented 
mechanisms.  
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